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The problem of determining whether a set of locked transactions, accessing a distributed 
database, is guaranteed to produce only serializable schedules is examined. For a pair of 
transactions, with n steps, it is proved that this concurrency control problem, which is 
polynomially solvable for centralized databases, is in general coNP-complete. A new graph- 
theoretic technique is employed and an G(n’) test for the special case of databases distributed 
between two sites is provided. 
1. INTR~DUCTI~N 
The goal of concurrency control is to safeguard the integrity of a database updated 
by concurrent transactions, without unnecessarily restricting the parallelism of the 
system. Most existing systems enforce concurrency control using locking [3, lo]; see 
also [2] for an interesting exception. In locking, the transactions are modified by 
appropriately inserting lock and unlock steps between the update steps. These steps 
obtain and give up exclusive access to granules of data (called entities here), and are 
enough for forbidding all incorrect interleavings of transaction steps. A most popular 
strategy for applying locks is the two-phase locking method of [3]; more relaxed 
methods are known to work on specially structured databases [ 12, 17-191. 
Due to its importance as a concurrency control tool, locking has been studied 
extensively from a theoretical standpoint and has proved to be rich in interesting 
combinatorics. Results include an elegant geometric methodology for studying 
locking [5, 7, 14, 171, an exact characterization of all correct locking policies as those 
built around a hypergraph [ 18, 191, and the precise determination of the power of 
locking, i.e., the range of concurrency control principles realizable by locking [8,9]. 
Variants of locking, such as shared locks, intention locks, etc. [ 161, although 
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important for implementation considerations, are known to change the theory very 
little [B, 18, 191. 
The concurrency control problem (like most computational problems) becomes 
much more challenging in a distributed environment [ 11. This is reflected in the 
existing concurrency control systems for distributed databases, which are invariably 
extremely complex, and sometimes incorrect. This apparent qualitative jump in 
conceptual complexity, in going from centralized to distributed concurrency control, 
was captured in [4], by using the methods of computational complexity. Intuitively, 
what was proved in [4] is that distributed concurrency control embodies the full 
conceptual and computational difficulty of a two-person game [ 111, played between 
the distributed concurrency control algorithm and the users. As such games are 
among the most complex and puzzling mathematical objects, this result appears to 
capture the apparent difftculty of distributed concurrency control. 
Our model for distributed databases is very simple: They are ordinary databases, 
only with the entities partitioned into sites. We do not treat explicitly data redun- 
dancy [ 11, which appears to be at the root of the complexitly of previous models. If 
entity x stored at site 1 happens to be a copy of entity y stored at site 2, then this is 
part of the integrity constraints of the database, and was presumably taken into 
account at transaction-design time. The big difference is that distributed transactions 
are partially ordered sets of actions, as opposed to the totally ordered straight-line 
programs of the centralized case. 
Locking has been used extensively for implementing distributed concurrency 
control [ 1,6, 10, 131. Still, with the exception of two-phase techniques (e.g., [ 1, 15]), 
there is little theoretical work on distributed locking. Moreover, the methods 
implemented and their analysis seem to reflect a certain impression among 
researchers that distributed locking is in principle a straightforward extension of the 
centralized case. It would be remarkable if the simplicity of locking levels the 
difference in complexity between centralized and distributed concurrency control. No 
formal statement or proof of such a result exists in the literature, but neither is there a 
single piece of evidence of a qualitative jump analogous to that shown in [4] for 
concurrency control in general. 
In this paper we attempt to determine, to what degree the methods and results 
concerning centralized locking can be extended to the distributed case. We focus on 
the issue of correctness, i.e., telling whether a set of locked transactions is guaranteed 
to produce only serializable schedules (see any of the references and Section 2 for 
definitions of serializability). In the centralized case, the geometric method of [ 171 
yields that this is an easy problem in every respect [5,7, 171. We discover that the 
geometric method of [ 171 must now be complemented with a graph-theoretic 
technique to obtain the answer. Our condition for a two-transaction system to be safe 
(allow only serializable interleavings) is that a certain directed graph be strongly 
connected. This condition is sz@cient (Theorem l), but not necessary for distributed 
transactions; we give a four site example to show this. It is necessary and sufficient 
for one site, and this gives an interesting insight into centralized locking. 
Our first main result is the rather surprising fact, that this simple condition is 
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necessary and suflcient for two sites (Theorem 2). In contrast, the negative results in 
[4] already hold for two-site databases. We do not know whether our condition is 
necessary for three sites; the only case left open here. We show, however, that the 
problem for many sites is co NP-complete (Theorem 3). This basic difference with the 
centralized case is our evidence that distributed databases are more complex, even 
vis-a-vis locking (although one needs more than two sites to notice the increased 
complexity). 
On the positive side, we show that an extension of the techniques in [7, 171 
succeeds in generalizing the correctness criterion to more than two transactions. We 
also discuss how the exact characterization of safe locking policies can be easily 
extended to the distributed case. 
Section 2 contains the definition of our model. Section 3 contains a proof of the 
sufficiency of the condition, Section 4 of its necessity for two sites, and Section 5 the 
co NP-completeness for an arbitrary number of sites. Finally in Section 6 we discuss 
the extension of this to many transactions, the issue of safe locking policies and in 
closing some open problems. 
2. THE MODEL 
A distributed database is a triple D = (E, m, a), where E = (x, y,...,} is a set of 
entities, m > 0 is the number of sites, and u: E -+ { 1, 2,..., m) is the stored-at function, 
assigning a site to each entity. 
A transaction is a triple T = (S, A, e), where S is a set of steps, (S, A) is a partial 
order on S, and e : S --) E is the modifies function assigning to each step s an entity 
e(s). An important restriction is that transactions are totally ordered at each site, that 
is, if a(e(s)) = o(e(s’)), then {(s, s'), (s', s)} nA # 0 (this gives us ordinary, 
centralized transactions as a special case when m = 1). 
In the absence of more detailed semantics, each step s is understood as the 
indivisible execution of two instructions: 
temp, := e(s), e(s) :=_fs(temps,,..., temp ), 
where s i,..., sk are all the nodes in S preceding s in T (including s itself) [3, 171. This 
interpretation of a step is called an update. Therefore the set of directed arcs of T 
reflects both information flow (dependency) and time precedence. 
A special kind of transaction is a locked transaction. In a locked transaction, 
certain steps s have the special semantics lock e(s) or unlock e(s) (i.e., the entity e(s) 
has a lock bit which is set to 1 or 0). All other steps are updates. We assume the 
following: 
A transaction T has at most one lock x-unlock x pair of steps for 
each entity x, the former step preceding the latter in the partial 
order of T. The lock or unlock steps appear in T only as such 
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pairs. If these steps exist there is at least one update x step 
between them in the partial order of T. There is no update x step 
not surrounded by such a pair. 
Any locked transaction not satisfying these constraints is either incorrectly or super- 
fluously locked [3, 171. 
Let T = {T, ,..., T,} be a set of locked transactions. 
A schedule h is a total ordering of all the steps, such that: 
(a) h does not contradict any partial order in T, and 
(b) for each x, every two lock x steps in h are separated by an unlock x step. 
Intuitively, a schedule h is a total ordering of any concurrent execution of the 
transactions of T, that is allowed by the lock-unlock steps. h is serializable [3, 7] if it 
is equivalent to a serial schedue, under all interpretations of the update functions f, 
(see the definition of a transaction above). 
T is called safe if all schedules are serializable (this is a very widely accepted 
notion of correctness [3, 171). 
In Fig. 1 we show two transactions, defined on a two site system. The partial 
orders are the transitive closures of the dags used to illustrate the transactions. We 
have that x and y are stored at site 1, w and z at site 2. We abbreviate update x by x, 
lock x by Lx and unlock x by Ux. This system is unsafe; a nonserializable schedule is 
shown. 
Finally we note that a transaction T, like any partial order, can alternatively be 
thought of as the set of all total orders t compatible with it. For such a total order t 
we write t E T. 







FIG. 1. Two transactions distributed at two sites and a nonserializable schedule. Transaction steps 
are identified in schedule by subscripts 1 and 2. 
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3. A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR SAFETY 
We restrict ourselves to pairs of transactions (the many 
examined in Section 6). 
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transaction case is 
If the transactions happen to be total orders, then there is no difference from the 
centralized case. Consider a pair of totally ordered transactions {tl, tz}. In the coor- 
dinated plane (see Fig. 2) take the two axes to correspond to t, and t,, and the integer 
points 1,2, etc. on these axes to correspond to the steps t, ,,..., tl,,,, (resp. t,, ,..., t2,,,J 
of the transactions. A point of the plane represents a possible state of progress made 
toward the completion of t, and tz . These transactions will contain lock-unlock steps. 
Each entity x such that both t, and t2 contain a Lx-Ux pair, has the effect of creating 
a forbidden region (a rectangle delimited by the grid lines corresponding to the 
Lx-Ux steps), the points of which represent unreachable states (see Fig. 2). 
A schedule has the following geometric image: It is a nondecreasing curve from the 
point (0,O) to the point (m, + 1, m2 + l), not passing through any other grid point 
and not through any forbidden rectangle (e.g., h in Fig. 2). To read the schedule off 
any such curve we simply enumerate the grid lines that it intersects. The two serial 
schedules are represented by the curves h 1, h, in Fig. 2. For example, 
h=ttt tt tt ttt tt t t ttt t 11 12 13 14 IS 16 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 17 18 19’ 
The following was proved in [7, 171 for total orders t,, t,. 
PROPOSITION 1. A schedule is not serializable iff it separates two rectangles. 
Hence {t, , tz} is unsafe iff there is a curve (i.e., a schedule) separating two rectangles. 
Therefore h in Fig. 2 is not serializable, as it separates the rectangles corresponding 
to x and z. Based on the above criterion nonsafety can be tested in O(n log n 
log log n) time [5], or even O(n log n) time [ 141, for transaction systems with n steps. 
What happens, however, in the nondegenerate distributed case (i.e., when the trans- 
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The geometric picture of two totally ordered transactions. 
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LEMMA 1. {T,, T,} is safe iff for all total orders t, E T,, t, E T, {tI, t2} is safe. 
In Fig. 3, for example, the transaction system {T,, T,} of Fig. 3a, b is unsafe. This 
is because {tl , tf } is unsafe (Fig. 3d), even though {tl , t2} is safe (Fig. 3~). We omit 
the update steps, as they do not affect safety under our assumptions [ 17-191. 
Thus, the extra complications of the distributed case stem from the fact that 
Proposition 1 must be checked against all (exponentially many) pairs of total orders 
compatible with the transactions. How can we do this in a simple, nonexhaustive 
manner? One approach employs graph theory. 
DEFINITION 1. For a transaction pair {T,, T,) let D(T,, TJ be the directed 
graph (V, A), where 
(1) V is the set of all entities locked-unlocked by both T, and T,, 
(2) (x, y) E A iff Lx precedes Uy in T, , and Ly precedes Ux in T,. 
In other words (x, y) is an arc of D(T,, TJ iff in any {t,, t2} compatible with {T,, 
T,}, the upper-left corner of the x-rectangle is, in all geometric pictures, above and to 
the left of the lower-right corner of the y-rectangle (see Fig. 4). For example, for the 
transactions {T,, T,} of Fig. 3, we show D(T,, T,) in Fig. 3e. 
DEFINITION 2. A dominator X of a directed graph D = (V, A) is a nonempty 
proper subset of the nodes V with no incoming arcs from V - X. 
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FIG. 3. An unsafe distributed transaction system. 
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FIG. 4. Illustrating Definition 1. 
An example of a dominator is x, y in Fig. 3e. It is easy to see that a directed graph 
has a dominator iff it is not strongly connected. Strong connectivity is at the heart of 
our sufficiency condition for safety. 
THEOREM 1. Let {T,, T,} be a locked transaction system. If D(T,, T,) is 
strongly connected, then {T, , T,} is safe. 
Proof. Suppose that T, and T, conflict at variables xi, x2 ,..., xk. Then for 
D(T,, TJ = (V, A) we have I’= {x,, x2,..., xk}. We can associate with every 
nondecreasing curve, that is the image of a schedule h, a vector of k binary values 
B = (6,) b*,..., b,J. These values are 
bi= 1 if h passes above the x,-rectangle, 
bi = 0 if h passes below the x,-rectangle. 
Therefore if (xixj) E A we can say that: for all schedules h we have in B bi < bj 
(i.e., only bi = 1, bj = 1 or bi = 0, bj = 0 or bi = 0, bj = 1 are allowed). 
Since D(T,, T,) is strongly connected there is a directed path (xp ... xq) for 
1 <p, q < k, p # q. Thus always bi < .. - < bj and bj < a.. < bi for all i, j, hence 
bi = bj. This implies that the only allowable values for the vectors B are (0, O,..., 0) 
and (1, l,..., 1). Thus for all (tl, &)-planes there is no nondecreasing curve 
corresponding to a schedule separating two rectangles. Therefore {T,, T,) is safe. i 
In Fig. 3e, D(T,, T,) is not strongly connected and not unexpectedly, since we saw 
that (T,, T,} is unsafe. So, the strong connectivity of D(T,, T,) is a sufficient 
condition for safety. Is it necessary? In Fig. 5 we show two transactions T,, T2 on 4 
sites, which establish that it is not. Their D(T,, T,) is not strongly connected, but, as 
an exhaustive analysis shows, {T,, T2} is safe. 
The condition of Theorem 1 is easily proven to be necessary for centralized (single- 
site) transactions. In other words let a transaction system consist of two total orders 
{t,, t,}; we have that if D(t,, tJ is not strongly connected, then the system is unsafe. 
This follows from Proposition 1, Definitions 1 and 2, and the fact that there is only 
one possible geometric picture. The detailed argument is a special case of a more 







FIG. 5. A four site transaction system. 
general result presented in the next section where we show that the condition of 
Theorem 1 is also necessary for two site transactions. Therefore Theorem 1 represents 
an alternative to geometric methods [5, 141. 
4. THE CASE OF Two SITES 
We prove 
THEOREM 2. Let T = {T,, T,} be a locked transaction system, where T,, T, are 
distributed at two sites. Then T is safe iff D(T,, TJ is strongly connected. 
The if part follows from Theorem 1. The proof for the only if direction is more 
involved, since we have to construct a certificate of unsafeness for the transaction 
system. 
We will assume D( T, , T,) = (V, A) is not strongly connected and will prove T to 
be unsafe. For this type of distributed transactions there could be an exponential 
number of possible (t,, t,)-planes. Let X be a dominator of D(T,, T,), i.e., a 
nonempty proper subset of the nodes with no incoming arcs from V-X. Since 
D(T, , T2) is not strongly connected a dominator X exists. We use X to construct two 
special total orders t,, t, that will help us separate all x-rectangles (x E X), from all 
z-rectangles (z E V-X). Therefore these t,, t, will provide us with a certificate of 
unsafeness. We will use the notation >, for precedes in Ti and pi for its negation; 
recall that steps can be concurrent. The notation we use is consistent with the 
direction of arcs in the dags that represent transactions in the various figures. 
We will first prove two lemmas. The first lemma is independent of the number of 
sites the transactions are distributed at. 
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LEMMA 2. Suppose X is a dominator of D(T,, T,) and for z, x, y we have: 
(1) ZE V-Xandx,yEX, 
(2) Lz > , Ux and Ly >2 Uz. 
Then we can infer 
(3) xfy and iJx<, Uy and Lx<,Ly. 
Proof. Since X is a dominator of D(T,, T2) it cannot contain either of the 
directed edges (z, x) or (z, y). We can infer (3) because, if x = y then 
(z, x) E D(T, , T,), or if (Ux > 1 Uy) then we have (Lz > 1 Uy) and (z, y) E D(T, , T,), 
or finally if (Lx >z Ly) then (Lx > 2 Uz) and (z, x) E D(T, , T2). This completes the 
proof of Lemma 2. I 
For any dominator X and z, x, y satisfying (I), (2), and (3) we can construct the 
following partial orders: 
Ti is T, with the added precedence Uy > , , Ux, 
T; is T2 with the added precedence Ly > z I Lx. 
Thus, T; equals Ti (i = 1, 2) with at most one precedence added (i.e., if the additional 
precedence were already in Ti then T; = Ti). By Proposition 1, if {T;, T; } is unsafe so 
is {T,, T,}. (Obviously each new T,! (i = 1,2) is a partial order). 
Based on the existence of only two sites we will prove the following important fact 
about the new system T’ = (T;, T;} and the dominator X for T = {T,, T2} 
LEMMA 3. If X is a dominator of D(T,, T,), it is also a dominator of D(T;, T;). 
Proof Since x, y, z are distinct variables we have three cases; 
Case a: x, y stored at the same site, 
Case b: x, y stored at different sites and z stored at the same site as x, 
Case c: x, y stored at different sites and z stored at the same site as y. 
We will use the restriction that transaction steps on entities stored at the same site are 
totally ordered (Section 2). 
Case a. If x, y are stored at the same site we must have, by Lemma 2, that 
(Ly > 2 Lx) and (Uy > 1 Ux) (these actions cannot be concurrent in T, or T,). 
Therefore T; = Ti (i = 1, 2) and Lemma 3 follows trivially. 
Case b. We have that x and z are stored at the same site and (Lz >, Ux) (the 
possible positions of Lz are illustrated in Fig. 6). Since (z, x) is not in D(T,, TJ we 
must have (Uz >2 Lx) (i.e., these actions cannot be concurrent in T,, because x and z 
are at the same site). Since (Ly >* Uz >* Lx), we have that already (Ly >* Lx) and 
therefore T; = T,. We only add precedence (Uy >, I Ux) to T, to obtain T;. 
The only way for new edges to be generated in D(T;, T;) from a z’ E V-X into 
571/28/1-f 
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site 1 site 2 site 1 site 2 
TZ’ = T, 
FIGURE 6 
an x’ E X, is for (Lz’ >, Uy) and (Ux >i Ux’) (x’ could be x). These z’ and x’ 
should be stored at different sites (otherwise Lz’, Ux’ should have been ordered 
already in T,). Moreover in T, = T; we must have (Lx’ >* Uz’). 
If z’ and x were stored at the same site, x’ must be stored at the site of y. Thus in 
T, we must have had (Lz’ > 1 Uy and Uy > 1 Ux’), otherwise the new edge would have 
introduced a cycle in T;. Therefore Lz’ and Ux’ would already be ordered in T, , a 
contradiction. Thus z’ and y are stored at the same site, and x’ is stored at the other 
site. 
In Fig. 6 we illustrate the possible positions of Lz’ and Ux’ in T,. From these 
ranges of Lz’ and Ux’ in T,, we can derive the possible positions of Uz’ and Lx’ in 
T,. Since D(T,, T2) cannot contain either (z’, y) or (z, x’) and since (Lz’ >, Uy) and 
(Lz > 1 Ux’) we must have (Uz’ > 2 Ly) and (Uz > z Lx’). It easily follows from the 
established ranges and the precedence (Lx’ >* Uz’) that T2 contains a cycle 
(UzLx’Uz’LyUz) a contradiction. 
Case c. We can easily establish this case by an argument similar to that of 
Case b. 
This completes the proof of Lemma 3. I 
DEFINITION 3. For a transaction system R = {T: , Tl }, let X be a dominator of 
D(T: , T:) = (V,A) such that: 
the conditions, (z E V-X), (x, y E X), (Lz > , + Ux), (Ly > 2 + Uz) 
imply (UY > 1 + Ux), (LY > 2+ Lx). 
Then, we say that R is closed with respect to dominator X. 
This closure property of {T: , T: }, with respect to X, expresses a constraint on all 
total orders compatible with these two partial orders. Namely, if the upper-left corner 
of a z-rectangle (z E V-X) is always forced to be above the lower-right corner of a 
y-rectangle (y E X) and to the left of the lower-right corner of a x-rectangle (x E X), 
then these two lower-right corners are forced to be placed in a certain fashion. The 
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lower-right corner of the y-rectangle must be below and to the left of that of the x- 
rectangle, thus the two lower boundaries of the rectangles form a nondecreasing 
curve. Our objective is to show that the z-rectangle can be placed below this 
nondecreasing curve. 
A consequence of closure with respect to dominator X is that in Lemma 2 Ux, Uy 
cannot be concurrent in T: (and Lx, Ly cannot be concurrent in T:). It should be 
noted that two total orders {tl, t2} are closed with respect to any dominator of 
D(tr 7 td* 
Using Lemmas 2 and 3 we can complete the proof of Theorem 2. 
Proof of Theorem 2. In order to construct the certificate of unsafeness of T we 
pick a dominator X of D(T,, T,). Starting from T we can add precedences and 
construct a sequence of transaction systems T’, T”,..., R (of length polynomial in the 
size of T) such that R = {T: , Tl ), is closed with respect to the dominator X. This is 
possible, by repeated use of Lemma 3. 
Now all we have to do is produce the total orders t,, t, from topologically sorting 
T: , Tl . Our goal is to isolate the rectangles of X, in the upper left corner of the 
coordinated plane, from the rectangles of V-X, in the lower right corner. The 
closure property of R makes this possible. 
We use two tricks: First, we place the Ux (i.e., x in X) steps as early as possible in 
t 1. We do this by topologically sorting T:, giving priority to Ux steps (i.e., 
examining these steps first in our depth-first search). Second, we place the Lx (i.e., x 
in X) steps as late as possible in t,. We do this by topologically sorting T:, giving 
priority to non-Lx steps. Moreover, if Ux was placed before Ux’ in t, we put Lx 
before Lx’ in t, (if possible). Again we can assign higher priority to Lx than to Lx’, 
based on the first topological sort. 
We have now produced the total orders (t,, t,}, and we create their geometric 
picture. It is easy to see that a nondecreasing curve, lower-bounding the area of the 
rectangles in X, is created by the lower-right corners of these rectangles (see Fig. 7). 
In order to prove that there is a separation between the rectangles of X and V- X, 
it s&ices to prove that: “If Ly comes in t, before Uz for some z in V-X, and Ly 
forms part of the lower-bounding curve, then Uy precedes Lz in t,” (see Fig. 7). In 
this case, the lower-bounding curve provides the required separating boundary 
between rectangles of X and V - X. 
FIGURE I 
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Let Ly precede Uz in the total order t,, and let this Ly be the first such lock step 
on the lower-bounding curve, before Uz. For this Ly we can argue that, in T:, 
(Ly >*+ Uz). This is because of the way t, was constructed. Since priority was given 
to Uz over Ly we must have had (Ly >*+ Uz), or there has to be another 
Ly’(y’ E X) that precedes Uz in the partial order that was topologically sorted (i.e., 
(Ly’ >*+ Uz)). Moreover, in this second case, this Ly’ must have been placed after 
Ly in the topological sort. Then we must have (Ly >*+ Ly’), else Ly’ would have 
been placed before Ly in t, (recall that the lower-right corner of the y-rectangle is 
part of the lower-bounding curve and recall the way we broke ties in t, based on t,). 
From the closure properties of R we know that for the above mentioned y and all 
x E X such that (Lz >1+ Ux) we have (Uy >1+ Ux). By the way t, was constructed 
(Uy as early as possible) we can infer that Uy precedes Lz in t, . Thus the upper-left 
corner of the z-rectangle is placed in the “niche” formed by the nondecreasing lower- 
bounding curve. 
We have shown that X-rectangles are below and to the right of all non X-rectangles 
in the (t,, Q-plane, and therefore {T: , T:} is unsafe, and so is {T,, T,]. This 
completes the proof of Theorem 2. 1 
If the transaction system {T,, T,} has 12 steps, then from Theorem 2, by testing for 
strongly connected components, we have 
COROLLARY 1. We can test in O(n’) time, whether a two site transaction system 
{ T, , T, } is safe. 
From the proof of Theorem 2, where the two site assumption is used only for 
Lemma 3 to allow a closure operation, we also have 
COROLLARY 2. Let T = {T,, T,} be a distributed locked transaction system. If X 
is a dominator of D(T,, T2) and T is closed with respect to it, then T is unsafe. 
At this point we can easily see why the transactions in the example of Fig. 5 form 
a safe system (despite the fact that D(T,, TJ is not strongly connected). Any total 
orders {tl, t2}, compatible with the partial orders {T,, T,} of Fig. 5, that would 
certify unsafeness, must be closed with respect to the only possible dominator 
X = {x, , x2} of D(t,, tz). Yet, the conditions for closure (Definition 3) imply that in 
t, , Ux, must both precede and follow Ux,, a contradiction. 
5. Two TRANSACTIONS DISTRIBUTED AT MANY SITES 
For two transactions distributed at many sites we can show the following: 
THEOREM 3. Safety for a multisite transaction system is co NP-complete. 
Proof. It is easy to see that testing a multisite transaction system {T,, T,} for 
unsafeness is in NP. All that is required is to guess a pair of total orders (t, , tz} 
Given a CNF formula F we can construct two transactions T,(F) and T,(F) with 
D = D(T,(F), T,(F)). These transactions are unsafe iff F is satisfiable. Each entity 
locked and unlocked in these transactions belongs to its own site. The reduction 
proceeds in two steps, presented below as (I) and (II), and is illustrated in the 
example of Figs. 8 and 9. 
(I) Given formula F we first create the skeletons of T,(F) and 7’,(F). These 





An upper cycle. This cycle has nodes u, cij (for the jth literal of the 
ith clause), and dummy nodes separating the named nodes. 
A middle row of nodes, either single or in pairs, that are descendants 
of u. For the kth variable in F we have nodes wk and w;. These are 
single nodes, direct descendants of u, unless the kth variable appears 
in F twice unnegated. Then we have two copies of wk connected by 
arcs going in both directions, and one of the copies is a direct 
descendant of u. 
A lower cycle. This cycle has nodes v, zk, z; (for the kth variable and 
its negation), and dummy nodes separating the named nodes. The 
node v is a direct descendant of all middle nodes that are direct 
descendants of u. 
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compatible with the given partial orders and verify the separation of rectangles on 
their coordinated plane. For every certificate of unsafeness {t, , tz} we can obviously 
find a dominator X of o(tr, tJ, which is also a dominator of D(T,, T,). The two 
total orders are closed with respect to X. Unfortunately we cannot find certificates of 
unsafeness for every dominator Y of D(T,, TJ. This is because the total orders 
(certificates) we wish to find must both respect the partial orders and be closed with 
respect to Y. This could lead to a contradiction, such as a cycle in a dag (as it did in 
the case of Fig. 5). 
We will reduce the CNF satisJabiZity problem to the unsafeness of a pair of 
multisite transactions. Without loss of generality we may assume that: no CNF 
clause has more than three literals, and that each variable appears at most twice 
unnegated and at most once negated (this is a well-known NP-complete version of 
satisliability). 
A subset of nodes of D is a dominator iff it consists of the upper cycle and a 
subset of the middle row of strongly connected components. Moreover, we can realize 
the skeletons of the transactions, in a sparse fashion so that they are closed with 
respect to all dominators. The precedences we put in the partial orders are, first, those 
that make lock steps precede their corresponding unlock steps, and second only those 
precedences from Definition 1 that are required to realize the arcs of D. Using only 
these precedences it is easy to verify that the skeletons are closed with respect to all 
dominators. An example of D is illustrated in Fig. 8 with three dominators and the 
skeletons of the transactions in Figs. 9a,b. 
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dominator 1 
dominator 3 





X x X x X x 
0 0 7 0 0 0 
7 0 0 1 1 0 
1 1 7 7 1 1 
FIGURE 8 
(II) The second step of the reduction consists of completing T,(F) and T,(F), 
so that possible dominators remain invariant and we can find total orders compatible 
with “desirable” dominators only. Every dominator X can be thought of as an 
assignment of values to the literals of F. The kth variable (its negation) is assigned 
the value 1, iff wk (w;) belongs to the dominator (see Fig. 8). Undesirable dominators 
are: 
(1) Those that contain both wk and WA, (assign 1 to both the kth variable 
and its negation). 
(2) Those that do not contain any middle node that corresponds to a 
clause’s literals (assign 0 to all literals of a clause). 
For the completion we add precedences as in the “gadgets” of Figs. 9c,d, between 
upper, middle, and lower levels. We thus make sure that no undesirable dominator 
can possibly be the dominator for a pair of total orders and that every desirable 
dominator is the dominator for some pair of total orders. 
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23 7 
(- -La ,-, tc -L-c- - -lx- -La - tc- - 
12 13 21 22 23-l 
hh- -lie - tic- - - tlc-2;&- -UC - 
11 12 13 22 23 
(a) the skeleton of T,(F) 
I , 
I uc11uc12uc13 “c21”c22uc23 I 
(c) completing T, (F) 
L_ l_fc,,ik,-pc-,~ - tk-2;&;2* 
(b) the skeleton of T,(F) 
(- -LE ,-, tc-,iL-cy3- -tc- -LLa - 
21 
22tc-& - - ‘, 
i - ik-,-uz; “; tiz~2-uz- a’- 
3 3 
(d) completing T,(F) 
FIGURE 9 
Formally, we add the following arcs (precedences) to our transaction skeletons: 
(a) For all k’s (Lzk > , Uw,), (Lz; > , Uw~) and (Lw~ >* Uz;), (Lw; >* Uz,). 
(b) If variable xk is the jth (j= 1,2, 3) literal of the ith clause of F, 
&WR >I UC,) and (L~ttl+ti+l)~~d3) >2 uwd 
For every distinct occurrence of xk in F we use a different copy of wk, for (b). 
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(c) If the negation of xk is the jth (j = 1,2,3) literal of the ith clause we use 
w; in case (b). 
Two literal clauses are easily handled in a similar fashion. 
First we note that D and the dominators are the same as before (use Definition 1). 
For undesirable dominators we can show that, any total orders that are closed with 
respect to one of them are forced to contain cycles, a contradiction. Using 
Definition 3 we can rule out dominators of both types (1) and (2). For example, for 
dominator 3 of Fig. 8, using w,, IV;, z,, and z; we force a pair of total orders {t,, tz}, 
that would serve as a certificate of unsafeness, to have Uw, both precede and follow 
UW; in t,. Dominators that correspond to assignments falsifying a clause (type (2)) 
force cycles of length three in our total orders. Conversely for all other dominators, 
using Definition 3, we can produce partial orders that have the closure property, and 
use Corollary 2 to construct certificates of unsafeness. 
Therefore we have transformed a formula F into a pair of distributed transactions 
that are unsafe iff F is satisfiable. u 
6. DISCUSSION 
In [ 7, 171 we showed that the safety question of centralized transaction systems 
with more than two transactions can be reduced to the two-transaction case. In this 
section we outline the generalization of that technique to the distributed case. This 
generalization completes our analysis of distributed locking. Since it provides no new 
insights or new complexity results beyond the centralized case, we omit proofs. 
Let T = {T, ,..., T,} be a distributed transaction system. Let G be a graph with 
vertex set T, and containing the edge [ Ti, Tj] iff Ti and Tj lock-unlock a common 
entity. For each path (and direction) of length two (Ti, Tj, Tk) of G we define a 
directed graph B,,, as follows: 
Bij, has a node xii (x;), for each entity x (x’) locked-unlocked by transactions T/ 
and Tj and a node yjk (yj,J, for each entity y (y’) locked-unlocked by transactions Tj 
and T,. B,, has arcs: 
CxijT Yjk) iff Lx precedes Uy in Tj) 
(xjjTx;) iff Lx precedes Lx’ in Tj, 
(Yjk9Y.L) iff Uy precedes Uy ’ in Tj. 
As in the centralized case we have 
PROPOSITION 2. T is safe iff 
(a) all of its two-transaction subsystems are safe, and 
(b) for each directed cycle c of G, the graph B, resulting by taking the union of 
the BIjk’S for all subpaths (Ti, Tj, T,) of c, has a cycle. 
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Since testing for the condition of Proposition 2 is already co M-complete in the 
centralized case [7], the same holds for the distributed case. Theorem 1 and 
Proposition 2 can be used to prove correct all existing distributed locking 
methodologies. 
Finally, let us remark that the elegant theory of correct locking policies [ 181 can be 
extended almost verbatim to the distributed case. Intuitively, a policy is a class of 
locked distributed transactions, presumably described by a set of rules that check the 
legality of a particular lock or unlock step by examining the previous history of the 
transaction (see [ 17-191 for formal definitions). A locking policy is correct if the 
class is safe, when considered as a transaction system. It was shown in [ 171 that a 
locking policy is correct if and only if it can be considered as a hypergruph policy a 
generalization of the hierarchical schemes of [ 121 to directed hypergraphs. 
In distributed databases, a locking policy (i.e., a class of distributed locked trans- 
actions) can be considered as a centralized locking policy, by taking the union of all 
the transactions, considered as sets of totally ordered transactions. It follows that a 
policy is correct iff its centralized image is. Consequently, the characterization of 
[ 171 still holds, if one interprets previous step as preceding step in the partial order. 
We have studied distributed locking from a formal standpoint, with an eye towards 
demonstrating the increased complexity of distributed concurrency control, even in 
the relatively well-behaved case of locking algorithms. We have shown that a problem 
that is easy in the centralized case (testing two-transaction systems for safety) 
becomes co NP-complete in the distributed case. However, this time the jump does 
not occur until after we have introduced at least three sites. The graph-theoretic 
condition that we used to understand safety for two site systems can be a useful tool 
for guaranteeing safety in more complex situations. Another apparent difference 
between the distributed and the centralized problem is that, in the centralized case, 
deadlocks can be studied side by side with correctness [7]. Distributed deadlocks (a 
problem left open here) appear to be subtle, and to require a different methodology. 
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